Kezdjük egy egészen érdekessel:
A Fulford bíró vezett tanács (Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság) tegnap felfüggesztette (stay of proceedings) a Lubanga pert, mert az ügyészi hivatal nem hajtotta végre a tanács egyik döntését:
"20. The history set out above reveals two concurrent but essentially different problems. The first - the immediate cause of the present hiatus - is the Prosecutor's unequivocal refusal to implement the repeated orders of this Chamber to disclose the identity of 143 (in highly restricted circumstances, determined by the Chamber). It may well be that this first difficulty is timelimited, in the sense that a delay of a few days or weeks may result in the prosecution's objections evaporating once protective measures, acceptable to 143, have been implemented. No doubt, if that occurs, the Chamber will be asked to continue with the evidence of 321 (and the trial, if it is stayed) because it is proposed that in those altered circumstances he can be questioned by the defence on a fair basis. However, if the identifying information for 143, despite the orders of the Chamber, is not disclosed to the defence, then the Chamber will need to scrutinize the impact of this eventuality in the context of its overall assessment of the evidence in the case, and the fairness of the proceedings against the accused. Notably, the Chamber is currently hearing evidence on a confined, but significant, issue that includes the allegation that the prosecution has knowingly employed, or made use of, intermediaries who influenced individuals to give false testimony, thereby abusing its powers. Failure to disclose information which is relevant for the examination of witnesses testifying in this context is likely to be relevant to defence abuse application.
21. The second problem, however, reveals a more profound and enduring concern. The Prosecutor, by his refusal to implement the orders of the Chamber and in the filings set out above, has revealed that he does not consider that he is bound to comply with judicial decisions that relate to a fundamental aspect of trial proceedings, namely the protection of those who have been affected by their interaction with the Court, in the sense that they have had dealings with the prosecution. Essentially, for the issues covered by Article 68 in this way, he appears to argue that the prosecution has autonomy to comply with, or disregard, the orders of the Chamber, depending on its interpretation of its responsibilities under the Rome Statute framework.
27. No criminal court can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an order in a particular area, it is for the Prosecutor to elect whether or not to implement it, depending on his interpretation of his obligations. The judges, not the Prosecutor, decide on protective measures during the trial, once the Chamber is seized of the relevant issue, as regards victims, witnesses and others affected by the work of the Court, and the prosecution cannot choose to ignore its rulings. It is for the Chamber to determine whether protective measures are necessary (following consultation with the VWU under Article 68(4) of the Statute); their nature; and whether they are consistent with the accused's right to a fair trial. These are issues for the Court, and the Court alone, to determine, having heard submissions and having considered all the information the judges consider necessary and relevant. The Prosecutor now claims a separate authority which can defeat the orders of the Court, and which thereby involves a profound, unacceptable and unjustified intrusion into the role of the judiciary.
28. The Prosecutor has chosen to prosecute this accused. In the Chamber's judgment, he cannot be allowed to continue with this prosecution if he seeks to reserve to himself the right to avoid the Court's orders whenever he decides that they are inconsistent with his interpretation of his other obligations. In order for the Chamber to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, it is necessary that its orders, decisions and rulings are respected, unless and until they are overturned on appeal, or suspended by order of the Court.
31. Therefore, the Prosecutor has elected to act unilaterally in the present circumstances, and he declines to be "checked" by the Chamber. In these overall circumstances, it is necessary to stay these proceedings as an abuse of the process of the Court because of the material non-compliance with the Chamber's orders of 7 July 2010, and more generally, because of the Prosecutor's clearly evinced intention not to implement the Chamber's orders that are made in an Article 68 context, if he considers they conflict with his interpretation of the prosecution's other obligations. Whilst these circumstances endure, the fair trial of the accused is no longer possible, and justice cannot be done, not least because the judges will have lost control of a significant aspect of the trial proceedings as provided under the Rome Statute framework. Whilst the stay of the proceedings is in place, the Chamber will deal with any application for leave to appeal on this or any related issue that is filed.
32. Otherwise, the Chamber will only entertain submissions regarding the possible application of Article 71 of the Statute at 15.30 on 8 July 2010, and submissions on the accused's detention at 9.30 on 15 July 2010."
A döntést Kevin John Heller egy nagyon kritikus cikkben kommentálta; érdemes hozzáolvasni Göran Sluiter válaszát (lásd a kommentek között)
*** Libanoni Speciális Törvényszék (STL)
Jövő hét kedden ritkaságszámba menő esemény lesz a Libanoni Speciális Törvényszéken (STL): meghallgatást tartanak Jamil El Sayed ügyében. Ő a négy tábornok közül az egyik, akit négy évi vizsgálati fogság után 2009-ben szabadlábra helyezett az STL.
Sayed Libanonban indított eljárást az őt, szerinte, alaptalanul gyanúsító tanúk ellen: az egyetlen bökkenő, hogy az ezt bizonyító iratokat az STL ügyészi hivatala őrzi. El Sayed most ezekhez szeretne hozzájutni. A meghallgatás pusztán arról fog szólni, hogy a törvényszéknek van –e egyáltalán joghatósága az ügy elbírálására (jurisdiction and standing) - Scheduling Order for Hearing.
***
ICTR, Arusha
Jussuf Munyakazi ügyében született elsőfokú ítélet, amit nem lepődnék meg, ha a fellebbviteli tanács megalapozatlanság miatt több pontos is megváltoztatna ().
Az eljárások elhúzódásával kapcsolatos a Bizimungu és tsai ügyben született döntés is. A 2:1 arányban meghozott döntés lényege:
Whether the Chamber’s failure to deliver its judgement 24 months after close of the evidence in this case is sufficient to constitute a violation of Mugiraneza’s right to a trial without undue delay.
Nincsenek megjegyzések:
Megjegyzés küldése