Belgium states in its Application that, “on 3 July 2001, taking the position that the Swiss shareholders had breached their contractual commitments and non-contractual duties, causing [the Belgian shareholders] injury”, the Belgian shareholders sued the Swiss shareholders in the commercial court of Brussels, seeking damages to compensate for the lost investments and for the expenses incurred “as a result of the defaults by the Swiss shareholders”. After finding jurisdiction in the matter, that court “found various instances of wrongdoing on the part of the Swiss shareholders but rejected the claims for damages brought by the Belgian shareholders”. Both Parties appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal of Brussels, which in 2005 by partial judgment upheld the Belgian courts’ jurisdiction over the dispute on the basis of the Lugano Convention. The proceedings on the merits are pending before that court and the case will be pleaded there in February and May 2010.
In various proceedings concerning the application for a debt-restructuring moratorium (sursis concordataire) submitted by the Swiss companies to the Zurich courts, the Belgian shareholders sought to declare their debt claims against them. It is asserted that the Swiss courts, including in particular the Federal Supreme Court, have however refused to recognize the future Belgian decisions on the civil liability of the Swiss shareholders or to stay their proceedings pending the outcome of the Belgian proceedings. According to Belgium, these refusals violate various provisions of the Lugano Convention and “the rules of general international law that govern the exercise of State authority, in particular in the judicial domain”. (részlet, ICJ press release)
"A panel of nine Justices of the Supreme Court determined that a criterion in an oversubscription policy of a faith school which gave priority to those regarded as 'Jewish by birth' constituted racial discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976. The facts were that M, a child, was refused admission to JFS, because he was not regarded as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. He was not regarded as Jewish because, despite his Jewish faith and practice, and despite the fact that his father (E) was Jewish by birth, he was not descended from a woman whom the Chief Rabbi regarded a Jewish. His mother was not born Jewish, but had converted to Judaism before M's birth. However, the Office of the Chief Rabbi did not recognise the mother's conversion to Judaism as it was not conducted in an Orthodox synagogue. The argument was as to whether the oversubscription criterion constituted direct discrimination on grounds of M's ethnic origin; or indirect discrimination which was not proportionate and so not objectively justified. The Court of Appeal had held that this amounted to direct race discrimination.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by JFS. On the direct discrimination issue, the decision was by a majority of five (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale, and Lords Mance, Kerr and Clarke) to four (Lords Hope, Rodger, Walker and Brown). The majority held that the admissions policy of the state maintained school directly discriminated on racial grounds against child M, and others like him. Lords Hope and Walker in the minority would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that JFS had indirectly discriminated against M as it had failed to demonstrate that its policy was proportionate. Lords Rodger and Brown would have allowed JFS’s appeal in its entirety. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed in part the United Synagogue’s appeal on costs."
Nem csak külsejében alakult át – előnyére - az Alkotmánybíróság honlapja; kereshetőség és átláthatóság szempontjából is remekbe szabott kis honlappal lepte meg magát az AB 20. születésnapjára.
Az angol nyelvű összefoglalók ún. CODICES summary ikonjára kattintva eljuthatunk a
A jogvelemenyen olvastam, hogy hamarosan (2010 februárjában) indul az Alkotmánybírósági Szemle. Az évente kétszer megjelenő új folyóirat ára azonban eléggé borsós 10500 Ft lesz/évfolyam. Csak remélni tudom, hogy elektronikus formábvan is hozzá lehet majd férni/elő lehet fizetni.
A strasbourgi emberi jogi bíróság 14-3 arányban az európai emberi jogi egyezménybe ütközőnek találta a bosznia-hercegovinai alkotmány azon részét, amely csupán az “államalkotó népcsoport” (constituent group) tagjainak - bosnyák, horvát, szerb - engedélyezte az alsóházba (House of Peoples, 15 fő), illetve a 3 fős Elnökségbe való megválasztást. (Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06)
A Velencei Bizottság amicus curiae-je letölthető innen.
Az Amnesty International, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Medical Aid for Palestinians, Mercy Corps és az Oxfam International tegnap megjelentetett közös jelentésében a következők állnak:
“One year after the start of military action in Gaza, the international community has betrayed the people of Gaza by failing to back their words with effective action to secure the ending of the Israeli blockade which is preventing reconstruction and recovery. The Israeli authorities have allowed only 41 truckloads of all construction materials into Gaza since the end of the offensive in mid-January, warn the authors of the report The task of rebuilding and repairing thousands of homes alone will require thousands of truckloads of building materials. Little of the extensive damage the offensive caused to homes, civilian infrastructure, public services, farms and businesses has been repaired because the civilian population, and the UN and aid agencies who help them, are prohibited from importing materials like cement and glass in all but a handful of cases”.
Barack Obama Stockholmban elmondott beszéde sok mindent elárul a jelenlegi amerikai elnök “jogos háborúhoz” és a háborús szabályok betart(at)ásához fűződő viszonyáról (a videó itt megtekinthető):
“To begin with, I believe that all nations - strong and weak alike - must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. I - like any head of state - reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that adhering to standards strengthens those who do, and isolates - and weakens - those who don’t. Furthermore, America cannot insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we don't, our action can appear arbitrary, and undercut the legitimacy of future intervention - no matter how justified.
This becomes particularly important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of one nation against an aggressor. More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.
I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That is why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe that the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength.
…[F]irst, in dealing with those nations that break rules and laws, I believe that we must develop alternatives to violence that are tough enough to change behavior - for if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions must exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure - and such pressure exists only when the world stands together as one.
The same principle applies to those who violate international law by brutalizing their own people. When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo or repression in Burma - there must be consequences. And the closer we stand together, the less likely we will be faced with the choice between armed intervention and complicity in oppression.”
Az utóbbi bekezdéshez illeszkedik a Council on Foreign Relations nem rég megjelent “Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities - International Norms and U.S. Policy” c. jelentése:
“This report concludes that the current international legal regime could be effective in stopping mass atrocities and that none of the oftenproposed radical reforms to international law will be more effective in the short term. To best combat the threat of mass atrocities consistent with other U.S. foreign policy interests and priorities, the United States should take independent steps and work with allies to improve the responsiveness of the existing UN Security Council system while preparing and signaling a willingness, if the UN Security Council fails to act in future mass atrocity crises, to take necessary action to address them. The major elements of a strategy should include strong but nuanced declarations of support for the “responsibility to protect,” a diplomatic effort to work with like-minded allies on common commitments to the responsibility to protect and redoubled engagement with other states to explain the U.S. position, and integration of this outreach with U.S. diplomacy on other international legal issues.”
A brit Legfelsőbb Bíróság a R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 ügyben hozott ítélete több szempontból is érdekes. Nemzetközi jogi szempontból azért, mert értelmezi a Human Rights Act azon bekezdését, amely szerint a brit bíróságoknak “figyelembe kell vennie” a strasbourgi bíróság ítéleteit, döntéseit (itt épp a Al-Khawaja ügyet). Büntetőeljárásjogi szempontból pedig azért, mert kimerítő elemzését adja a Criminal Justice Act 116 bekezdésének. Ez a rendelkezés lehetővé teszi a bíróságok számára, hogy pusztán olyan tanúk vallomása alapján ítélje el a vádlottat, akiknek a védelem nem tudott kérdéseket feltenni (cross-examination).
Karsai László történész 2004-ben jelentette meg “Érvek a Teleki-szobor mellett” című írását az Élet és Irodalom 2004/11. számában. A Legelsőbb Bíróság, hivatkozva a Ptk. 75, 78, 84 §-ra megállapította, hogy a Karsai a következő cikk-részlettel megsértette Török Bálint jóhírnévhez való jogát:
“Az Országgyűlési Könyvtár PRESSDOC-adatbázisában százával sorjáznak a Teleki Pálról szóló, őt hol gátlástalanul, hol mérsékeltebb hangnemben, de dicsőítő cikkek, tanulmányok.1 A szélsőségesen antiszemita és irredenta Hunnia Füzetek 1994-1995-ben 15 részes tanulmánysorozatot szentelt a volt miniszterelnöknek. Az amatőr történész Török Bálint is több hozsannázó cikket írt Teleki Pálról, a hívő katolikusról, a lelkes cserkésztisztről és - szerinte - náciellenes reálpolitikusról.[1]
Ezek a cikkek, tanulmányok javarészt visszhangtalanok maradtak. Kevesen vagyunk, akik legalább néha-néha kezünkbe veszünk jobboldali vagy szélsőjobboldali sajtótermékeket. Amelyek viszont, talán ezen is felbátorodva, egyre gátlástalanabbul hazudnak, rágalmaznak, uszítanak és zsidóznak.” (Karsai vs. Hungary, paras 9-10.)
A bírósági határozatok összefoglalóan a következőket tartalmazták:
13. On appeal, on 17 January 2006 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed this decision and found for the plaintiff. Relying on sections 75, 78 and 84 of the Civil Code, it ordered the applicant to arrange for the publication of a rectification at his expense and to pay the legal costs which amounted to 69,000 Hungarian forints (HUF). Assessing the applicant's statements in the context of the whole article, the Court of Appeal held that the impugned expression could be seen as relating to the plaintiff personally and that the applicant had failed to prove that it was true. In the court's opinion, to accuse, even contextually, the plaintiff of having 'bashed the Jews' was a statement of fact putting Mr B.T. in a false light and was thus capable of prejudicing his reputation.
14. On 28 June 2006 the Supreme Court upheld this decision, imposing another HUF 46,0004 in legal fees. It reaffirmed that “the impugned statement – which was made, in general terms, with regard to the right-wing (extreme right-wing) press – could also be considered to concern the plaintiff”. (Karsai v. Hungary, Application no. 5380/07)
Tegnap a strasbourgi Emberi Jogi Bíróság a Karsai v. Hungary, Application no. 5380/07 alatti ügyben megállapította, hogy a magyar bíróságok ítéletei ellentétesek az Egyezmény 10. pontjában foglalt szólásszabadság védelemével, így az Egyezmény megsértése miatt kötelezte a magyar államot 6310 euró megfizetésére:
29. The Court notes that the applicant participated in a public debate about the erection of a statue commemorating Pál Teleki, former Prime Minister of Hungary. In his view, revisionism of the role of Teleki and a public apology for his acts, as advocated by Mr B.T., was part of 'Jew-bashing'. In the ensuing proceedings, the domestic courts had to decide whether the statements made by the applicant actually concerned the plaintiff B.T., and whether they were factual and defamatory. Assessing the statements in the context of the whole article written by the applicant, the Court of Appeal held that the impugned expression could be seen as relating to the plaintiff personally, whereas the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the impugned statement – which was made, in general terms, with regard to the right-wing (extreme right-wing) press – could also be considered to concern the plaintiff”. The Court consequently considers that the reference to the plaintiff's person was present but indirect (see also paragraph 21 above).
30. The Court has next to establish to what extent the restriction on the applicant's freedom expression for the sake of indirectly protecting the reputation of Mr B.T. satisfied the requirements of necessity and proportionality. To that end, the Court will consider the nature of the statement, the resulting damage, the character of the debate, and the respective positions of the applicant and the plaintiff in that debate.
33. The Court notes that the applicant's argument contained a factual statement describing Mr B.T. as someone active in embellishing Pál Teleki's historical role. It appears from the circumstances of the case that this activity was not in dispute before the domestic courts. However, the Court considers that this statement of fact was a value-laden one. By indirectly referring to Mr B.T.'s published views, the applicant argued that the apology of a politician with well-known anti-Semitic convictions amounted to objective participation in the process, ongoing in the extreme-right wing press, of the trivialisation of his racist policies – a phenomenon labelled 'Jew-bashing'.
34. Consequently, the Court cannot fully endorse the domestic courts' findings that the dispute concerned a pure statement of fact; such a conclusion would restrict the protection due under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is satisfied that the conclusions advanced by the applicant cannot be considered excessive or devoid of factual basis, given Mr B.T.'s apologetic treatment of Pál Teleki – which was referred to by the applicant in his article and not denied by Mr B.T. before the courts – and in view of the role which Pál Teleki played in the enactment of anti-Semitic legislation in Hungary.
35. The Court furthermore notes that the applicant – a historian who had published extensively on the Holocaust – wrote the impugned article in the course of a debate concerning the intentions of a country, with episodes of totalitarianism in its history, to come to terms with its past. The debate was thus of utmost public interest (cf. Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, ECHR 2001-VIII; Azevedo v. Portugal, no. 20620/04, §§ 26 to 34, 27 March 2008; Riolo v. Italy, no. 42211/07, §§ 63 to 73, 17 July 2008).
It therefore considers that this publication deserves the high level of protection granted to the press in view of its functions. In this connection the Court refers to the summary of its established case-law on press freedom in the case of Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft (cited above, § 30). It reiterates that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on political speech or on the debate of questions of public interest (see, among many other authorities, Feldek, cited above, § 74). The Court is also mindful of the fact that the plaintiff B.T. was the author of articles widely published in the popular daily press as part of that debate. He thereby voluntarily exposed himself to public criticism. The Court notes that the applicant's disagreement with Mr B.T.'s views was formulated in indirect terms. However, it considers that even harsh criticism in the present context would be protected by Article 10 of the Convention, whether expressed directly or indirectly.
37. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not convincingly establish any pressing social need for putting the protection of the personality rights of a participant in a public debate above the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this freedom where issues of public interest are concerned. The reasons adduced by those courts cannot be regarded as a sufficient and relevant justification for the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. The national authorities therefore failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests.
38. Accordingly, the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
Ahogy arra Jogvélemény cikke felhívja a figyelmet, a Karsai ítéletnek automatikusan maga után kéne vonnia több hasonló ítélet felülvizsgálatát.
[1]Török Bálint: Teleki Pál emlékezete (Ring, 1991. N. 9. 13.); A morál fontosabb, mint a politika. Ötvenöt éve halt meg Teleki Pál (Magyar Nemzet, 1996. április 3. 8.); A reálpolitikus harca az erőszak ellen (Magyar Nemzet, 1999. november 1. 7.)
Novemberben valamennyire apadt a látogatók száma (211; 277 oldalbetöltés). A könnyedebb blogolást egy konferenciára való felkészülés akadályozta: november 20-án a Magyar Bíróképző Akadémián tartott nemzetközi büntető-eljárásjogi konferencián adtam elő.
Decemberben újult rendszerességgel fog jelentkezni a blog, köztük
- napi beszámolókkal a Nemzetközi Bíróság előtt folyó meghallgatásokról (Koszovó tanácsadó vélemény; december 1-11),
- az ICC előtt a hetekben elkezdődött Katanga és Ngudjoló perről,
- a koppenhágai klíma-konfereciáról (december 7-18),
