Karsai László történész 2004-ben jelentette meg “Érvek a Teleki-szobor mellett” című írását az Élet és Irodalom 2004/11. számában. A Legelsőbb Bíróság, hivatkozva a Ptk. 75, 78, 84 §-ra megállapította, hogy a Karsai a következő cikk-részlettel megsértette Török Bálint jóhírnévhez való jogát:
“Az Országgyűlési Könyvtár PRESSDOC-adatbázisában százával sorjáznak a Teleki Pálról szóló, őt hol gátlástalanul, hol mérsékeltebb hangnemben, de dicsőítő cikkek, tanulmányok.1 A szélsőségesen antiszemita és irredenta Hunnia Füzetek 1994-1995-ben 15 részes tanulmánysorozatot szentelt a volt miniszterelnöknek. Az amatőr történész Török Bálint is több hozsannázó cikket írt Teleki Pálról, a hívő katolikusról, a lelkes cserkésztisztről és - szerinte - náciellenes reálpolitikusról.[1]
Ezek a cikkek, tanulmányok javarészt visszhangtalanok maradtak. Kevesen vagyunk, akik legalább néha-néha kezünkbe veszünk jobboldali vagy szélsőjobboldali sajtótermékeket. Amelyek viszont, talán ezen is felbátorodva, egyre gátlástalanabbul hazudnak, rágalmaznak, uszítanak és zsidóznak.” (Karsai vs.
A bírósági határozatok összefoglalóan a következőket tartalmazták:
13. On appeal, on 17 January 2006 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed this decision and found for the plaintiff. Relying on sections 75, 78 and 84 of the Civil Code, it ordered the applicant to arrange for the publication of a rectification at his expense and to pay the legal costs which amounted to 69,000 Hungarian forints (HUF). Assessing the applicant's statements in the context of the whole article, the Court of Appeal held that the impugned expression could be seen as relating to the plaintiff personally and that the applicant had failed to prove that it was true. In the court's opinion, to accuse, even contextually, the plaintiff of having 'bashed the Jews' was a statement of fact putting Mr B.T. in a false light and was thus capable of prejudicing his reputation.
14. On 28 June 2006 the Supreme Court upheld this decision, imposing another HUF
Tegnap a strasbourgi Emberi Jogi Bíróság a Karsai v. Hungary, Application no. 5380/07 alatti ügyben megállapította, hogy a magyar bíróságok ítéletei ellentétesek az Egyezmény 10. pontjában foglalt szólásszabadság védelemével, így az Egyezmény megsértése miatt kötelezte a magyar államot 6310 euró megfizetésére:
29. The Court notes that the applicant participated in a public debate about the erection of a statue commemorating Pál Teleki, former Prime Minister of Hungary. In his view, revisionism of the role of Teleki and a public apology for his acts, as advocated by Mr B.T., was part of 'Jew-bashing'. In the ensuing proceedings, the domestic courts had to decide whether the statements made by the applicant actually concerned the plaintiff B.T., and whether they were factual and defamatory. Assessing the statements in the context of the whole article written by the applicant, the Court of Appeal held that the impugned expression could be seen as relating to the plaintiff personally, whereas the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the impugned statement – which was made, in general terms, with regard to the right-wing (extreme right-wing) press – could also be considered to concern the plaintiff”. The Court consequently considers that the reference to the plaintiff's person was present but indirect (see also paragraph 21 above).
30. The Court has next to establish to what extent the restriction on the applicant's freedom expression for the sake of indirectly protecting the reputation of Mr B.T. satisfied the requirements of necessity and proportionality. To that end, the Court will consider the nature of the statement, the resulting damage, the character of the debate, and the respective positions of the applicant and the plaintiff in that debate.
33. The Court notes that the applicant's argument contained a factual statement describing Mr B.T. as someone active in embellishing Pál Teleki's historical role. It appears from the circumstances of the case that this activity was not in dispute before the domestic courts. However, the Court considers that this statement of fact was a value-laden one. By indirectly referring to Mr B.T.'s published views, the applicant argued that the apology of a politician with well-known anti-Semitic convictions amounted to objective participation in the process, ongoing in the extreme-right wing press, of the trivialisation of his racist policies – a phenomenon labelled 'Jew-bashing'.
34. Consequently, the Court cannot fully endorse the domestic courts' findings that the dispute concerned a pure statement of fact; such a conclusion would restrict the protection due under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is satisfied that the conclusions advanced by the applicant cannot be considered excessive or devoid of factual basis, given Mr B.T.'s apologetic treatment of Pál Teleki – which was referred to by the applicant in his article and not denied by Mr B.T. before the courts – and in view of the role which Pál Teleki played in the enactment of anti-Semitic legislation in Hungary.
35. The Court furthermore notes that the applicant – a historian who had published extensively on the Holocaust – wrote the impugned article in the course of a debate concerning the intentions of a country, with episodes of totalitarianism in its history, to come to terms with its past. The debate was thus of utmost public interest (cf. Feldek v.
It therefore considers that this publication deserves the high level of protection granted to the press in view of its functions. In this connection the Court refers to the summary of its established case-law on press freedom in the case of Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft (cited above, § 30). It reiterates that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on political speech or on the debate of questions of public interest (see, among many other authorities, Feldek, cited above, § 74). The Court is also mindful of the fact that the plaintiff B.T. was the author of articles widely published in the popular daily press as part of that debate. He thereby voluntarily exposed himself to public criticism. The Court notes that the applicant's disagreement with Mr B.T.'s views was formulated in indirect terms. However, it considers that even harsh criticism in the present context would be protected by Article 10 of the Convention, whether expressed directly or indirectly.
37. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not convincingly establish any pressing social need for putting the protection of the personality rights of a participant in a public debate above the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this freedom where issues of public interest are concerned. The reasons adduced by those courts cannot be regarded as a sufficient and relevant justification for the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. The national authorities therefore failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests.
38. Accordingly, the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
Ahogy arra Jogvélemény cikke felhívja a figyelmet, a Karsai ítéletnek automatikusan maga után kéne vonnia több hasonló ítélet felülvizsgálatát.
[1]Török Bálint: Teleki Pál emlékezete (Ring, 1991. N. 9. 13.); A morál fontosabb, mint a politika. Ötvenöt éve halt meg Teleki Pál (Magyar Nemzet, 1996. április 3. 8.); A reálpolitikus harca az erőszak ellen (Magyar Nemzet, 1999. november 1. 7.)
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