A holland miniszterelnök által felkért Irak vizsgálóbizottság (Onderzoekcommissie Irak) január 12-én hozta nyilvánosságra 550 oldalas jelentését (a teljes szöveg hollandul itt, a hosszabb angol összefoglaló itt, a főbb következtetések innen tölthetőek le).
A jelentés, többek között, megállapítja:
That the government of the day subordinated the question of legitimacy under international law to the policy principles defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2002. Similarly, insufficient importance was attached to the information provided by the intelligence services and the weapons inspection reports. On the subject of international legitimacy, the Committee of Inquiry concludes that the Security Council resolutions on Iraq passed during the 1990s did not constitute a mandate for the US-British military intervention in 2003. Despite the existence of certain ambiguities, the wording of Resolution 1441 cannot reasonably be interpreted (as the Dutch government did) as authorizing individual Member States to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council’s resolutions, without authorization from the Security Council.
With regard to the information provided by the intelligence services and the international weapons inspection reports, the Committee of Inquiry concludes that neither the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) nor the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service) possessed any significant amount of independently sourced information about Iraq’s WMD programme. Both services based their assessments largely on the reports of the UN weapons inspectors and information supplied by foreign intelligence services. Nevertheless, the Committee takes the view that, over the period as a whole, the MIVD and the AIVD were more reserved in their assessments of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programme than government ministers were in their communications with the Lower House. According to the Committee of Inquiry, the reports made by the AIVD and in particular the MIVD concerning WMD were more nuanced than the public reports from other countries. These nuances were not reflected by the relevant ministers or departments; rather, ministers and departments extracted those statements from the intelligence services’ reports that were consistent with the stance already adopted. The Committee’s assessment is that, in its portrayal of Iraq’s WMD programme, the government was to a considerable extent led by public and other information from the US and the UK. In its discussions with the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Services Committee, the government did not allude to the nuances of the reports made by the MIVD and the AIVD. Contrary to the facts reported by the Committee of Inquiry, the Minister of Defence asserted in parliament that the AIVD and MIVD reports were not inconsistent with the public statements made by ministers.
A jelentés, többek között, megállapítja:
That the government of the day subordinated the question of legitimacy under international law to the policy principles defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2002. Similarly, insufficient importance was attached to the information provided by the intelligence services and the weapons inspection reports. On the subject of international legitimacy, the Committee of Inquiry concludes that the Security Council resolutions on Iraq passed during the 1990s did not constitute a mandate for the US-British military intervention in 2003. Despite the existence of certain ambiguities, the wording of Resolution 1441 cannot reasonably be interpreted (as the Dutch government did) as authorizing individual Member States to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council’s resolutions, without authorization from the Security Council.
With regard to the information provided by the intelligence services and the international weapons inspection reports, the Committee of Inquiry concludes that neither the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) nor the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service) possessed any significant amount of independently sourced information about Iraq’s WMD programme. Both services based their assessments largely on the reports of the UN weapons inspectors and information supplied by foreign intelligence services. Nevertheless, the Committee takes the view that, over the period as a whole, the MIVD and the AIVD were more reserved in their assessments of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programme than government ministers were in their communications with the Lower House. According to the Committee of Inquiry, the reports made by the AIVD and in particular the MIVD concerning WMD were more nuanced than the public reports from other countries. These nuances were not reflected by the relevant ministers or departments; rather, ministers and departments extracted those statements from the intelligence services’ reports that were consistent with the stance already adopted. The Committee’s assessment is that, in its portrayal of Iraq’s WMD programme, the government was to a considerable extent led by public and other information from the US and the UK. In its discussions with the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Services Committee, the government did not allude to the nuances of the reports made by the MIVD and the AIVD. Contrary to the facts reported by the Committee of Inquiry, the Minister of Defence asserted in parliament that the AIVD and MIVD reports were not inconsistent with the public statements made by ministers.
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