Az amerikai Legfelsőbb Bíróság egy pár nappal ezelőtt hozott
döntésében kimondta, hogy a kínzás áldozatait védő törvény (TVPA) értelmében
kizárólag természetes személy elkövetőkkel szemben lehet kártérítési igényt
előterjeszteni. A Mohamad
v. Palestinian Authority (No. 11–88. Argued February 28, 2012—Decided April
18, 2012) ügy fontosabb megállapításai alább olvashatók:
“Petitioners are the relatives of Azzam Rahim,
who immigrated to the United States in the 1970’s and became a naturalized citizen.
In 1995, while on a visit to the West Bank, Rahim was arrested by Palestinian
Authority intelligence officers. He was taken to a prison in Jericho, where he
was imprisoned, tortured, and ultimately killed”.
“Petitioners concede that foreign states may
not be sued under the Act—namely, that the Act does not create an exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq., which renders foreign sovereigns
largely immune from suits in U. S. courts. They argue, however, that the TVPA
does not similarly restrict liability against other juridical entities. In petitioners’ view, by permitting suit
against “[a]n individual,” the TVPA contemplates liability against natural
persons and non-sovereign organizations (a category that, petitioners assert,
includes respondents). We decline to read “individual” so unnaturally. The ordinary meaning of the word, fortified
by its statutory context, persuades us that the Act authorizes suit against
natural persons alone”.
“The Dictionary Act instructs that “[i]n
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . .
the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. §1 (emphasis added).
With the phrase “as well as,” the definition marks “individual” as distinct
from the list of artificial entities that precedes it”.
“Petitioners’ final argument is that the Act
would be rendered toothless by a construction of “individual” that limits
liability to natural persons. They
contend that precluding organizational liability may foreclose effective remedies
for victims and their relatives for any number of reasons. Victims may be
unable to identify the men and women who subjected them to torture, all the
while knowing the organization for whom they work. Personal jurisdiction may be more easily
established over corporate than human beings. And natural persons may be more
likely than organizations to be judgment proof.
Indeed, we are told that only two TVPA plaintiffs have been able to
recover successfully against a natural person—one only after the defendant won
the state lottery”.
“We acknowledge petitioners’ concerns about the
limitations on recovery. But they are
ones that Congress imposed and that we must respect. … Petitioners’ purposive
argument simply cannot overcome the force of the plain text. We add only that
Congress appeared well aware of the limited nature of the cause of action it
established in the Act”.
“The text of the TVPA convinces us that
Congress did not extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not. There are
no doubt valid arguments for such an extension. But Congress has seen fit to
proceed in more modest steps in the Act, and it is not the province of this
Branch to do otherwise”.
Nincsenek megjegyzések:
Megjegyzés küldése