A nemzetközi büntetőbíróságok alkonya , avagy tényleg a nemzeti bíróságok a jövő letéteményesei?

FRISSITÉS, NOVEMBER 3.

A nemzetközi büntetőbíróságok politikai delegitimációs szerepét hangsúlyozó állításra Daniel Saxon válaszolt itt.

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A Carsten Stahn a következő érdekes cikkben próbál válaszokat adni a fentebbi kérdésre.

Követendő példa a Budapesti Népirtás Megelőzési Nemzetközi Központnak

A Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies augusztusban jelentette meg “Mobilising the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities” c. jelentését. Az intézet társigazgatója Roméo Dallaire, az 1993-1994-ben Ruandában állomásozó UNAMIR I, ENSZ békefenntartó egység parancsnoka. A szerzők a jelentést a repülőgép-szerencsétlenségben tragikus hirtelenséggel elhunyt Alison Des Forges-nak ajánlják.

A magyar külügyminisztérium által felállítani kívánt Budapesti Népirtás Megelőzési Nemzetközi Központnak előnyére vállhat az ilyen és ehhez hasonló külföldi intézmények “best practice”-einek tanulmányozása.

A 160 oldalas dolgozat a következőket tartalmazza:

“…[w] we are struck not by the absence of the will to intervene to prevent genocide, but by the presence of the will not to intervene, a negative thrust evident among the leaders of Canada, the United States, and other democracies when confronting the great mass atrocities of the 20th and 21st centuries. These mass atrocities were surely “contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations,” as the U.N. expressed it in 1946, but “moral law” and “the spirit and aims of the United Nations” carry very little weight in the national interest and partisan political calculations that shape foreign policies in the capitals of the great democracies.

This report was born in hope - our hope that concrete factual analyses and practical recommendations can change the way our democratically elected political leaders think and act. We ask for nothing less than a paradigm shift, a change in how our leaders view the world. Specifically, we seek to persuade the leaders of Canada and the United States to adopt a concept of the national interest that incorporates the notion that preventing genocide and mass atrocities serves the interests of their people and not doing so puts the welfare of their citizens at risk. The age of the global village has dawned. Ignoring instability and conflict leading to genocides and mass atrocities today seriously threatens the health, security, and prosperity of our two peoples. We can and we must change. “Yes we can prevent genocide and mass atrocities” is our motto for achieving a better and more secure future, not just for societies vulnerable to mass atrocities, but for our children and grandchildren right here in North America.

The fundamental goal of this report is to identify strategic and practical steps to raise the capacity of government officials, legislators, civil servants, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, journalists, and media owners and managers to build the political will to prevent mass atrocities. The Will to Intervene (W2I) Project report, Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities, draws on interviews with more than 80 foreign policy practitioners and opinion shapers in Canada and the United States. Many of the interviewees participated directly in Canadian and American government decision making during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1999 Kosovo crisis.

The interviews furnished us with an inside view of the decision making processes that shaped each country’s responses to Rwanda and Kosovo, exemplifying a failure to act and a strong will to act. The W2I Project’s researchers also wanted to understand what civil society groups and the news media could have done to ramp up the pressure on Prime Minister Chrétien and President Clinton to save lives in Rwanda. We wanted to learn if civil society played a role in the decisions of Canada and the United States to preserve lives in Kosovo and what considerations propelled the decision to intervene. We designed our questions with an eye to the future, hunting for “lessons learned,” informed not only by our interviews, but also by scholarly studies of Canadian and U.S. Government policies.

One of the major outcomes of the W2I study is the finding that when leadership at the top is absent, civil society in Canada and the United States must strongly pressure governments to broaden their concept of “national interests.” Saving the lives of innocent civilians in future Rwandas and Kosovos is vital to saving lives in Canada and the United States. More and more, our security is threatened by neglected crises in faraway places. Thanks to the growth in international travel by business people, tourists, and aid workers, infectious disease outbreaks arising in once ignored areas like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Zimbabwe now pose real challenges to our public health. As well, mass atrocities undermine the foundations of political stability in entire regions of the globalized international economy and threaten our economic prosperity. Our stake in international security has converged with our stake in humanitarian principles as never before. We need to redefine our national interests more broadly, not only to help failing states, but also to help and protect ourselves. W2I’s message to Canadian and American politicians is that to be a responsible leader you must spearhead policies and programs that prevent mass atrocities.”

Zentai Károly kiadható Magyarországnak

Az ausztrál szövetségi bíróság (Federal Court of Australia) október 8-ai jogerős döntése értelmében, az egy rendbeli háborús bűncselekménnyel “gyanúsított” Zentai Károly kiadható Magyarországnak. A Pocakos News blogon részletesen lehet olvasni az ügy hátteréről.

Érdekes fejlemény: a Zentait képviselő ügyvéd szerint Magyarországon nem is folyik büntetőeljárás Zentai ellen:

“Mr Zentai’s lawyers today argued that the nominated offence of a war crime was not an offence in Hungary in 1944, and they questioned whether it could qualify as an extraditionary offence. They later told the bench that Hungary wanted Mr Zentai for an interrogation and not for trial, adding he could still be interrogated in Australia.A letter from the Leader of the Military Panel in Hungary, Dr Bela Varga, confirmed “there is no criminal proceeding at present” against Mr Zentai, and said he was only wanted for questioning “in the interest of the investigation”.”

A döntés lényegi megállapításai a következők:

12. The appellant argues that by reason of the terms of Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty, the war crime alleged against him is not an ‘extraditable offence’ as described in the Treaty. The appellant says that the warrant issued by the Republic of Hungary against him alleges he committed a war crime in Budapest on 8 November 1944. The warrant relies on the war crime, as defined, having been made an offence by legislation of the Republic of Hungary enacted in 1945 which applies retrospectively in the Republic of Hungary to include 8 November 1944. The appellant contends that the offence alleged against him by the Republic of Hungary in the warrant was not an offence in the Requesting State ‘at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offence’ as required by Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty, notwithstanding that the law of the Republic of Hungary gives the war crime offence retrospective effect in the Republic of Hungary.

13. In conducting the review under s 21 of the Act, the primary judge held, on the authority of the decision of the High Court of Australia in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528 (Kainhofer), that it was not a function of the s 19 magistrate, or the Court on review, to determine by reference to the Treaty whether the appellant was an ‘extraditable person’ or had committed an ‘extradition offence’ for the purposes of the Act.

14. The sole issue for determination in this appeal is whether the s 19 magistrate, in conducting the hearing under s 19 of the Act to determine the appellant's eligibility for surrender, and in turn the primary judge in conducting the review under s 21, was required, as put by counsel for the appellant in their written submissions to this Court on appeal, “to refrain from determining whether the war crime was an extradition offence, by reason of the Minister for Justice issuing a notice under s 16 of the Act specifying the appellant as an ‘extraditable person’”.

39. The appellant's key submission is that s 19(1) and s 19(2) of the Act cannot sensibly operate without the requesting State nominating an ‘extradition offence’ that relevantly has legal effect according to the Act. The hearing magistrate must therefore ascertain that such an offence exists. That is a jurisdictional pre condition separate from, and in addition to, the other stipulated matters the s 19 magistrate is required to determine, and is modified in this case by Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty. By force of those provisions a person cannot be eligible for surrender in relation to an offence that did not exist at the time the relevant conduct is alleged to have occurred.

40. The appellant contends therefore that the issue before the s 19 magistrate is not simply whether the facts alleged in the supporting documents were adequately described or were such as to satisfy the minimum requirements of the foreign offence. Rather, the issue properly for determination extends to whether there was a relevant foreign extradition offence in the first place. The existence of that jurisdictional pre condition is not a matter falling outside the ambit of those sections; rather, it is intrinsic to s 19.

76. We accept that the answer sought by the appellant to the substantive question concerning Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty is demonstrably an important one. We appreciate that, while in theory it may be possible for a person in the position of the appellant to make representations on such a question before a s 12 magistrate when an application for a provisional arrest warrant is considered, or with the Attorney General before a notice is issued under s 16 of the Act, it will not always be the case that such questions are fully considered at that stage. We recognise, however, that it is open to a person in the position of the appellant to seek judicial review, at least of the decision of the Attorney General to issue a notice under s 16, before a determination is made by a s 19 magistrate. We also consider that it may well be the case that, following a declaration under s 19(9), the question can again be raised before the Attorney General before he or she makes a surrender decision under s 22 of the Act. Any decision of the Attorney General under s 22 would also, on the face of it, be amenable to judicial review in the manner described above.

77. It might be said, as was observed by Toohey J in Kainhofer at 541 and repeated by the Full Federal Court in Papazoglou at 140 – 141, that the system established by the Act represents a substantial shift away from judicial review of the extradition process towards the exercise of unreviewable executive discretion. Nevertheless, the reviewable exercise by the Attorney General of the power under s 22 of the Act to consider whether, in the final analysis, a person should be surrendered to another country, plainly is of critical importance to the rights or interests of a person affected by an extradition proceeding.

78. None of that means, however, that the primary judge made any appellable error in determining that it was no part of the function of the second respondent in conducting the hearing under s 19 of the Act, and no part of the function of the primary judge in conducting a review of that decision under s 21, to determine whether the war crime alleged against the appellant was an extradition offence or whether the appellant was an extraditable person for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.

A Különleges Libanoni Törvényszék (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) első féléves tevékenysége

FRISSÍTÉS! október 17.

Az ICC éves tevékenységéről szóló jelentés itt olvasható.

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A Hága külvárosában, Leidschendamban székelő Különleges Libanoni Törvényszék (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) márciusban kezdte meg működését; Antonio Cassese elnök szeptember végén publikálta a bíróság tevékenységéről szóló első féléves jelentését.

Az jugoszláv törvényszék (ICTY) 2008-2009-as működéséről szóló jelentés itt, az ICTR éves beszámolója pedig itt olvasható.

A bírósági határozatok elektronikus nyilvánossága Magyarországon - Eötvös Károly Intézet

Az Eötvös Károly Intézet honlapján olvasható “Az igazságszolgáltatás nyilvánossága különös tekintettel a bírósági határozatok nyilvánosságára” címmel közli legújabb tanulmányát.

A nemzetközi kitekintés Észtországgal hasonlítja össze Magyarországot, és megállapítja, hogy:

“Mivel konkrétan az elektronikus információszabadság bírósági ítéletekre vonatkozó részét elemeztük, ezért megvizsgáltuk a törvényi rendelkezéseket, valamint részletesen foglalkoztunk magával a Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteményének a vizsgálatával. Vizsgálódásunk egyszerre volt leíró, feltáró és értékelő jellegű.”

“A Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteményének elemzésekor azt állapítottuk meg, hogy az elektronikus információszabadságról szóló törvény rendelkezései - bár véleményünk szerint a törvény a személyi és időbeli hatály tekintetében módosításra szorulnak – az igazságszolgáltatás tekintetében alapvetően kielégítőnek tekinthetők.”

“Jelentős információhiány tapasztalható az igazságszolgáltatás nyilvánosságának területén, amelyre a kérdőívek elemzése mutatott rá. Annak ellenére, hogy kifejezetten előremutató jogszabályi háttérrel rendelkezünk az elektronikus információszabadság terén, az igazságszolgáltatást érintő szabályokról, a Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteményéről még a jogász szakma képviselői is csak hiányos, vagy fél információkkal bírnak. Vélhetően ez még inkább igaz a közvéleményre általánosságban. A nyilvánosság a társadalmi kontroll szerepét nem töltheti be akkor, ha a közvélemény nincs tisztában azokkal az információkkal, hogy milyen adatok, hol és hogyan érhetőek el. Ahhoz, hogy minden érdeklődő élni tudjon a törvény adta jogaival, bővebb és alaposabb tájékoztatás szükséges. A Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteményének működése elégtelen, az adatbázis nem felel meg az információszabadság alapelveinek, ezért több szempontból is korrekcióra szorul. Mind a konkrét ítéletek megkeresése, mind a kérdőíves felmérés eredményei arra utalnak, hogy a Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteménye nem használható a törvény előírásainak megfelelően. A keresőrendszer rosszul működik, ezért gyakran fordul elő, hogy még a jogi végzettséggel rendelkezők sem találják meg a keresett ítéletet vagy ügycsoportot. A kutatásunk feltárta azt a tényt is, hogy az adatbázis nemcsak, hogy nem nevezhető felhasználóbarátnak, de a jogszabályi követelményeknek sem felel meg. Azzal, hogy a rendszer nem képes értelmezni a /A, /B, stb. §-t, számos jogszabályhely egyszerűen nem létezik az adatbázisban.” (pp. 39-40.)

Megkezdte működését Nagy Britannia új legfelsőbb bírósága

Ahogy arról korábban beszámoltam, október 1-től átalakul a brit igazságszolgáltatási rendszer és a legfelsőbb bíróság intézménye váltja fel a Lordok Házát.

Akit érdekelnek a bírósággal kapcsolatos legfrissebb hírek, beadványok, praktikus információk, az mostantól az amerikai Scotusbloghoz hasonlóan lapozgathat a UK Supreme Court blogon.

EU tényfeltáró-jelentés az orosz-grúz háborúról: jogsértések mindkét oldalon

A 2008 decemberében, az EU Miniszterek Tanácsa által életre hívott International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) tegnap hozta nyilvánosságra tényfeltáró jelentését.

A 44 oldalas első kötet foglalja össze az EU történetében első tényfeltáró bizottság megállapításait. A második kötet tartalmazza a bizottság által felkért szakértők írásait, a harmadik kötet pedig a becsatolt és hivatkozott dokumentumokat. A főbb megállapítások:

“This Report will try to give a fair and even-handed view of the actions taken by the sides to the conflict, and their reasons as well as their consequences. Many of these will be critically reviewed. Nothing, however, will touch upon our respect for either individual fates or the aspirations of the peoples of the region, large or small. These aspirations were not the decisive causes of the hostilities, as similar problems were peacefully solved elsewhere. It was the way in which these problems were handled and sometimes exploited which paved the way to armed confrontation. On this basis of respect and understanding, it is the purpose of this Report to describe the events that occurred, so that conclusions might be drawn for a safer future of the region and beyond.” (Jelentés p. 10)

“According to the overwhelmingly accepted uti possidetis principle, only former constituent republics such as Georgia but not territorial sub-units such as South Ossetia or Abkhazia are granted independence in case of dismemberment of a larger entity such as the former Soviet Union. Hence, South Ossetia did not have a right to secede from Georgia, and the same holds true for Abkhazia for much of the same reasons. Recognition of breakaway entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia by a third country is consequently contrary to international law in terms of an unlawful interference in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected country, which is Georgia.” (p. 17.)

“The mass conferral of Russian citizenship to Georgian nationals and the provision of passports on a massive scale on Georgian territory, including its breakaway provinces, without the consent of the Georgian Government runs against the principles of good neighbourliness and constitutes an open challenge to Georgian sovereignty and an interference in the internal affairs of Georgia.” (p. 18.)

“There is the question of whether the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia, beginning with the shelling of Tskhinvali during the night of 7/8 August 2008, was justifiable under international law. It was not.”

“Even if it were assumed that Georgia was repelling an attack, e.g. in response to South Ossetian attacks against Georgian populated villages in the region, according to international law, its armed response would have to be both necessary and proportional. It is not possible to accept that the shelling of Tskhinvali during much of the night with GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) and heavy artillery would satisfy the requirements of having been necessary and proportionate in order to defend those villages. It follows from the illegal character of the Georgian military assault that South Ossetian defensive action in response did conform to international law in terms of legitimate self-defence. However, any operations of South Ossetian forces outside of the purpose of repelling the Georgian armed attack, in particular acts perpetrated against ethnic Georgians inside and outside South Ossetia, must be considered as having violated International Humanitarian Law and in many cases also Human Rights Law. Furthermore, all South Ossetian military actions directed against Georgian armed forces after the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 had come into effect were illegal as well. (pp. 22-23.)

“Consequently, the use of force by Georgia against Russian peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August 2008 was contrary to international law.” (p. 23)

“It follows from this that insofar as such extended Russian military action reaching out into Georgia was conducted in violation of international law, Georgian military forces were acting in legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate military action had thus turned around between the two main actors Georgia and Russia.” (p. 24)

“As for the conflict in South Ossetia and adjacent parts of the territory of Georgia, the Mission established that all sides to the conflict - Georgian forces, Russian forces and South Ossetian forces - committed violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Numerous violations were committed by South Ossetian irregular armed groups, by volunteers or mercenaries or by armed individuals. It is, however, difficult to identify the responsibilities for and the perpetrators of these crimes. The fact

that both Georgian and Russian forces in many cases used similar armament further complicates the attribution of certain acts. If it were not for the difficulties of identification and attribution, many of these acts have features which might be described as war crimes.” (p. 26.)

Szeptember - 255 látogató, 351 kattintás

Augusztushoz képest negyedével többen látogattak az oldalra, és másfélszer több oldalt nyitottak meg.

A blogot érthető módon a legtöbben (75%) Magyarországon olvassák. A fennmaradó részen főleg kárpát-medencei országok osztoznak, de Svájcból, Németországból, sőt Taiwanból, Törökországból és Kenyából is látogatják az oldalt.

International Crime and Justice mester-képzés Torinóban

A torinói egyetem és a UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) a 2008 november és 2010 júliusa közötti időszakra mesterkurzust hirdetett meg “Nemzetközi bűncselekmények és nemzetközi igazságszolgáltatás” címmel.

A brosúra szerint a program egy 2009. november 16 - 2010. január 22-ig tartó távoktatási, és egy februártól júliusi tartó olaszországi periódusból áll.

Ismerve néhány korábbi diákot, akik nagyon gyorsan el tudtak helyezkedni Hágában vagy Genfben, csak ajánlani tudom mindenkinek, hogy pályázzon.

A jelentkezés határideje 2009. október 5 (email vagy fax), a papír alapú jelentkezésnek október 12-ig kell megérkezni a Viale Maestri del Lavoro 10, 10127 Torino címre.

A tandíj 6000 euró, de lehetőség van pályázni ugyanekkora összegű ösztöndíjra.

Mit kezdenek a felhalmozódott háborús ügyekkel Bosznia-Hercegovinában?

A Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law 180-as oldalas kiadványa elsőrangúan mutatja be, hogy a bosznia-hercegovinai igazságszolgáltatási rendszer miként is próbál megbirkózni a háború utáni indított perek tömegével.

Ezt kiegészítendő érdekes hozzáolvasni az ICTY, az UNICRI és a OSCE, “Supporting the Transition Process: Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Knowledge Transfer” c. jelentését, ami a nemzetközi törvényszéken felhalmozódott praktikák és újítások leghatékonyabb felhasználásáról szól.

Mikor vonhat magához egy ügyet/szituációt a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság?

A Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság működését a komplementaritás elve határozza meg, vagyis a joghatósági kritériumok fennállása esetén is csak akkor vonhat magához egy ügyet (admissibility), ha a Statútum 17. cikkében foglalt feltételek teljesülnek.

A fellebbviteli tanács szeptember 25-ei döntésében több ponton is értelmezte ezen szakaszt, és megállapította, hogy

1. Under article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the question of unwillingness or inability has to be considered only (1) when there are, at the time of the proceedings in respect of an admissibility challenge, domestic investigations or prosecutions that could render the case inadmissible before the Court, or (2) when there have been such investigations and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.

2. Inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute.

A Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo ellen folyó eljárásban született döntés, Katanga fellebbezésének harmadik (para 58-86) és negyedik (87-113) pontját utasította ezzel el.

Közgyűlési határozat az R2P-ről

A nemzetközi közösség az elmúlt évtizedben eléggé felemás sikereket könyvelhetett el a népirtással (is) járó konfliktusok megelőzésében, leállításában (Kambodzsa, Irak, Ruanda). Minden állam felelősséggel tartozik megóvni lakosait az emberiesség, a háborús bűncselekmények és a népirtással szemben, mondja a responsibility to protect (R2P, RtoP) néven futó legújabb ENSZ mantra. Persze ez így mind szép, de hogy ez milyen kapcsolatban is áll az erőszak alkalmazásának ENSZ BT monopóliumával vagy a humanitárius intervenció, szintén eléggé ködös fogalmaival, az nem világos.

Mindenesetre a 2005-ös World Summit Outcome dokumentumban az államok a következőket fektették le:

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Az R2P végrehajtásáról szóló ENSZ főtitkári jelentést (A/63/677) júliusban vitatta meg a Közgyűlés, majd szeptember 14-ei határozatában (A/RES/63/308, egyelőre még nem tölthető le a Közgyűlés honlapjáról) egyhangúan az R2P további részleteinek a kidolgozása mellett döntött.

Az International Law Observer-ben további részleteket lehet olvasni.

Balázs Péter az ENSZ Közgyűlésén

A magyar külügyminiszter az ENSZ közgyűlés 64. ülésszakának általános vitájában elmondott beszéde meghallgatható itt.

Mi legyen a Guantanamón raboskodó foglyokkal?

A Case Western University, Frederick K. Cox nemzetközi jogi központja egy nívós konferenciának adott otthont “After Guantanamo: The Way Forward” - Four Roundtables on Reconciling National Security and the Rule of Law címmel.

Az előadások és panel-beszélgetések megtekinthetők itt.

A konferencia hang- és képanyaga mellett a témához kapcsolódó cikkek és tanulmányok is letölthetőek.

Dél-Szudán, békefolyamat - Abyei választottbírósági döntés

A dél-szudáni békefolyamot nagyban befolyásoló választottbírósági döntés született a hágai Állandó Nemzetközi Választottbíróságon (Permanent Court of Arbitration) 2009. július 22-én.

Az American Society of International Law ismét remekbe szabott összefoglalóval állt elő. A választottbírósági döntés főbb megállapításai itt olvashatóak.

Ítélet Carla del Ponte volt sajtófőnöke, Florence Hartmann ügyében

Tegnap az ICTY különleges bírói tanácsa, a nemzetközi igazságszolgáltatás elleni bűncselekményben bűnösnek találta, ám igen enyhe, mindösszesen csak 7000 eurós pénzbüntetésre ítélte Florence Hartmann-t, Carla del Ponte volt sajtófőnökét. Egyelőre csak a szóbeli ítélehirdetés során felolvasott összefoglaló áll rendelkezésünkre, így elhamarkodott lenne az értékelés, de annyi mindenesetre megállapítható, hogy a bíróság mindkét vádpontot megalapozottnak találta.

Az eljárás az angolszász jogrendszerekben ismert, ún. contempt of court (itt: a törvényszék jogszolgáltatása elleni bűncselekmény) alapján folyt. A vád szerint Hartmann két, napjainkban is még titkos, fellebbviteli döntés tartalmát hozta nyilvánosságra könyvében és ebben a cikkben.

A szegedi egyetem oktatója, Karsai Krisztina európai büntetőjogász egy kiváló tanulmányban foglalkozik a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróságnál is megtalálható jogintézménnyel.

Goldstone-bizottság jelentése az Öntött Ólom hadműveletről

FRISSÍTÉS! (2009. október 4.)

Az American Society of International Law periodikusan jelentkező Insights rovata elemzést közöl a jelentésről.

FRISSÍTÉS! (2009. szeptember 18.)

Az EJILTalk-on Marko Milanovic elemzi a Goldstone-jelentést: definitively more to come on this subject.

Az izraeli külügyminisztérium honlapján olvasható közlemény itt tölthető le.

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Ma hozták nyilvánosságra az ENSZ Emberi Jogi Tanácsa (Human Rights Council) által 2009. április 3-án életre hívott nemzetközi bizottság jelentését.

A United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict elnöke az ICTY volt főügyésze Richard Goldstone, tagjai Christine Chinkin, a London School of Economics professzora, Hina Jilani, a 2005-ös darfúri nemzetközi tényfeltáró bizottság tagja, és Desmond Travers, az Institute for International Criminal Investigations (IICI) elnökségi tagja, az ír hadsereg nyugalmazott ezredese. Az 575 oldalas jelentésnek egyelőre csak a főbb megállapításait áll módomban röviden összefoglalni (csak az összefoglaló következtetések 33 oldalra rúgnak, pp. 5-38):

“The Mission decided to focus primarily on events, actions or circumstances occurring since 19 June 2008, when a ceasefire was agreed between the Government of Israel and Hamas. The Mission has also taken into consideration matters occurring after the end of military operations that constitute continuing human rights and international humanitarian law violations related to or as a consequence of the military operations, up to 31 July 2009. This report does not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the very high number of relevant incidents that occurred in the period covered by the Mission’s mandate. Nevertheless, the Mission considers that the report is illustrative of the main patterns of violations. In Gaza, the Mission investigated 36 incidents.” (paras 12, 16.)

“The Mission conducted 188 individual interviews. It reviewed more than 300 reports, submissions and other documentation either researched of its own motion, received in reply to its call for submissions and notes verbales or provided during meetings or otherwise, amounting to more than 10,000 pages, over 30 videos and 1,200 photographs. By refusing to cooperate with the Mission, the Government of Israel prevented it from meeting Israeli government officials, but also from travelling to Israel to meet with Israeli victims and to the West Bank to meet with Palestinian Authority representatives and Palestinian victims. In order to provide the parties concerned with an opportunity to submit additional relevant information and express their position and respond to allegations, the Mission also submitted comprehensive lists of questions to the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza authorities in advance of completing its analysis and findings. The Mission received replies from the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza authorities but not from Israel.” (paras 20-21, 26)

“In many cases it has found that acts entailing individual criminal responsibility have been committed. In all of these cases the Mission has found that there is sufficient information to establish the objective elements of the crimes in question. In almost all of the cases the Mission has also been able to determine whether or not it appears that the acts in question were done deliberately or recklessly or in the knowledge that the consequence that resulted would result in the ordinary course of events. The Mission has thus referred in many cases to the relevant fault element (mens rea). The Mission fully appreciates the importance of the presumption of innocence: the findings in the report do not subvert the operation of that principle. The findings do not attempt to identify the individuals responsible for the commission of offences nor do they pretend to reach the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials.” (para 25)

A blokádról

“The Mission holds the view that Israel continues to be duty-bound under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to the full extent of the means available to it to ensure the supply of food stuff, medical and hospital items and others to meet the humanitarian needs of the population of the Gaza Strip without qualification.” (para 28)

A központi börtön és a palesztin törvényhozó tanács épülete elleni támadás

As far as attacks on buildings are concerned, the Mission examined the Israeli strikes against the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Gaza main prison (Chapter VII). Both buildings were destroyed to an extent that puts them out of use. Statements by Israeli Government and armed forces representatives justified the attacks arguing that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the “Hamas terrorist infrastructure”. The Mission rejects this position. It finds that there is no evidence that the Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison made an effective contribution to military action. On the information available to it, the Mission finds that the attacks on these buildings constituted deliberate attacks on civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. These facts further indicate the commission of the grave breach of extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” (para 32.)

A gázai rendőrök elleni támadások

“The Mission examined the attacks against six police facilities, four of them during the first minutes of the military operations on 27 December 2008, resulting in the death of 99 policemen and nine members of the public. The overall around 240 (!) policemen killed by Israeli forces constitute more than one sixth of the Palestinian casualties.” (para 33, kiemelés tőlem)

“The Mission finds that, while a great number of the Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of Palestinian armed groups, the Gaza police were a civilian law-enforcement agency. The Mission also concludes that the policemen killed on 27 December 2008 cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and thus did not lose their civilian immunity from direct attack as civilians on this ground. The Mission accepts that there may be individual members of the Gaza police that were at the same time members of Palestinian armed groups and thus combatants. It concludes, however, that the attacks against the police facilities on the first day of the armed operations failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the vicinity), and therefore violated international humanitarian law.” (para 34)

A polgári lakosok élő pajzsként való alkalmazása

“The Mission was faced with a certain reluctance by the persons it interviewed in Gaza to discuss the activities of the armed groups. On the basis of the information gathered, the Mission found that Palestinian armed groups were present in urban areas during the military operations and launched rockets from urban areas. It may be that the Palestinian combatants did not at all times adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The Mission found no evidence, however, to suggest that Palestinian armed groups either directed civilians to areas where attacks were being launched or that they forced civilians to remain within the vicinity of the attacks.” (para 35)

“Although the situations investigated by the Mission did not establish the use of mosques for military purposes or to shield military activities, it cannot exclude that this might have occurred in other cases. The Mission did not find any evidence to support the allegations that hospital facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or by Palestinian armed groups to shield military activities and that ambulances were used to transport combatants or for other military purposes.” (para 36)

“The Mission acknowledges the significant efforts made by Israel to issue warnings through telephone calls, leaflets and radio broadcasts and accepts that in some cases, particularly when the warnings were sufficiently specific, they encouraged residents to leave an area and get out of harms way. However, the Mission also notes factors that significantly undermined the effectiveness of the warnings issued. These include the lack of specificity and thus credibility of many pre-recorded phone messages and leaflets. The credibility of instructions to move to city centres for safety was also diminished by the fact that the city centres themselves had been the subject of intense attacks during the air phase of the military operations. The Mission also examined the practice of dropping lighter explosives on roofs (so-called “roof knocking”). It concludes that this technique is not effective as a warning and constitutes a form of attack against the civilians inhabiting the building.” (para 37)